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New Labour and the Governance of Corporate Business 
GARY WILSON

  
In December 1998, Peter Mandelson M.P., one of the principal architects of the 
Labour Party’s victory in the May 1997 general election, dramatically resigned as 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Nevertheless, despite his relatively brief 
period in that office, Mr. Mandelson left his imprint on policy through the publication 
in November 1998 of a major white paper, ‘Our Competitive Future : Building the 
Knowledge Driven Economy’. The white paper sets out the New Labour analysis of 
the national political economy in a globalised world economy and is very much 
influenced by Mr. Mandelson’s experience of the entrepreneurial spirit during his 
fact-finding visit to the United States. This article seeks to chart the relationship 
between New Labour’s desire to foster the development of the corporate sector within 
a vibrant entrepreneurial culture and the need to ensure that the integrity of the 
market is preserved in an arena which is seen as inimicable to strong regulatory 
intervention by the state. As well as mapping New Labour’s political rhetoric onto 
contemporary debates in corporate governance, the analysis will involve an 
examination of the interface between business practice and morality. In particular, 
the article will focus upon the role of the conception of company directors as 
‘responsible risk takers’ and the upon the use of name and shame sanctions in the 
development of an entrepreneurial culture in which all corporate enterprises are seen 
as having a legitimate societal ‘licence to operate’. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The changes we face in the 21st century economy involve permanent 
economic revolution: continuous and rapid innovation that compels 
unprecedented flexibility and adaptability in skills and knowledge. 
Increasingly every good and every service will be exposed to relentless 
global competition. And to equip ourselves best to meet and master 
these challenges , we need a pro-enterprise, pro-opportunity Britain.
1
 
 
This article seeks to examine some of the various dimensions of the governance of 
corporate business in modern Britain.
 
In order to do this it is proposed to sketch out an 
overview of New Labour‟s approach to the subject as informed by its analysis of the 
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wider political economy. It should be noted that the primary objective of the article is 
to map this political rhetoric on to contemporary debates in corporate law and 
governance and that space does not, therefore, permit an extensive critical analysis of 
the many contestable concepts involved therein.
 
The importance of the current 
political interest in corporate law and governance should not be underestimated. 
Whilst such interest is hardly novel, the communitarian approach of New Labour has 
the potential to transcend the Thatcherite neo-liberal dichotomy between the private 
world of the economic actor and the public world of the societal actor through the 
creation of new regulatory spaces and community-based discursive processes. It 
remains to be seen  if such spaces or processes will emerge in actuality, as this will 
depend upon whether New Labour‟s particular communitarian mix proceeds by 
dialogue or edict. 
 
There is no shortage of primary source material in relation to United Kingdom 
company law as there is at present a great deal of interest in the subject in a large part 
due to the very extensive technical review of the area being undertaken currently by 
the Department of Trade and Industry. The aim of the review is to evaluate critically 
and holisitically the structural basis of U. K. company law that was laid down in the 
nineteenth century ( and which has only been revised incrementally during the present 
century ), so as to address explicitly the regulatory issues arising in the contemporary 
global economy, and thereby to provide a modern facilitative framework of company 
law that will be effective in promoting and sustaining an entrepreneurial economy.  
 
The article will, in particular, draw upon the following crucial D.T.I. Consultation 
Documents that have been issued in the course of the review, namely : Modern 
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Company Law for a Competitive Economy ( March 1998 ) and Modern Company Law 
for a Competitive Economy : The Strategic Framework ( February 1999 ).
2
  In order to 
chart the political dimensions of the debate, it is also proposed to centre discussion 
around three key speeches by the present Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
Stephen Byers M.P., namely the speeches: to the Lord Mayor‟s Trade and Industry 
Dinner at the Mansion House  ( 2 February 1999 ), which first introduced the concept 
of the director as a responsible risk taker; to the P.I.R.C. Annual Corporate 
Governance Conference ( 23 March 1999 ) and at the London Business School ( 21 
July 1999 ).
3
 
 
The principal substantive focus of the article will be on the Blair Government‟s 
perception of the inherent conceptual tension between the need for the state to 
promote the entrepreneurial flair required in order for the nation to prosper in the 
global knowledge economy, and the need to find an effective means of regulating the 
actors in that marketplace. In order to examine this tension ( which, although to some 
extent oppositional, is nevertheless not a paradox ) it is necessary to consider the 
interface of morality with entrepreneurial culture. It will be argued that only by so 
doing can an appropriate balance between risk taking and fraudulent or immoral 
business failure be established. This interface thus provides the key to the 
maintenance of the integrity necessary for the market to function, thereby ensuring 
both its economic and wider societal legitimacy. The vital importance of cultural 
attitudes in attaining the optimum form of business governance for the welfare and 
prosperity of the nation, together with the magnitude of the task in hand and the need 
to involve all of the members of society in the debate, are clearly demonstrated by 
Stephen Byers in his speech at the London Business School ( 21 July 1999 ):  
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Clearly shifting British culture onto a more enterprising and less risk-
averse track will take time. But we must all aspire to change the 
national mood if we are to create an outward looking, confident society, 
fit to take on the 21st century. 
 
 
However, as will be demonstrated, New Labour does not perceive itself as having a 
free hand to engineer the desired broad regulatory framework. For in the globalised 
economy „excessive‟ state regulation by traditional command and control techniques 
is rendered untenable, as inimicable and burdensome to the vital creative SME sector 
and due to the possibility of larger companies engaging in forum shopping by way of 
capital flight by to a more favourable regulatory regime.  Given the constraints thus 
believed to be imposed by the processes of globalisation, at a high level of abstraction 
the creation of the new governance regime is said, therefore, to require nothing less 
than, “... a new coalition between Government, business and society.”4  
 
At a more concrete level the political construction of a market morality depends upon 
a matrix of factors, one of the most important of which, since the legislative reforms 
of the Thatcher Government, is the structure of the insolvency regime.
5
 In contrast to 
company law, which is generally permissive and enabling in nature, insolvency law is 
by its very nature rather more interventionist. Accordingly, the state‟s interest and role 
in managing the orderly winding up and dissolution of companies is uncontentious. As 
such, the insolvency process provides an ideal mechanism for the state to undergird 
business values through the utilisation of the examples of bad practice thereby gleaned 
in order to illuminate desirable business behaviour. A model of this practice in 
operation ( which this article will focus upon by way of example ) is the Blair 
Government‟s  policy of naming and shaming rogue and phoenix company directors.  
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Unfortunately, whilst such a governance mechanism is a potentially powerful weapon 
in the armoury of the modern regulatory state, it is in the present context a policy 
instrument that requires careful handling. Once more, this difficulty refers back to the 
pervasive interface of business practice with morality introduced above, as it is also 
the case that the Government places a high priority on encouraging entrepreneurs in 
order to boost Britain‟s international competitiveness, and the stigma attaching to 
business failure is thought to be a powerful disincentive to such individuals. Indeed, 
such is the current weight that the Government attaches to the stigma arising from 
business failure, that the Insolvency Service has been instructed to undertake a review 
into this subject on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry and a consultation 
paper is proposed for winter 1999. 
 
It will be argued that the notion of the director as a „responsible risk taker‟ has gained 
substantial political and commercial currency ( although it should be acknowledged 
that the concept has yet to receive significant attention from the judiciary or legal 
profession ) as a way of balancing these opposing objectives, and that the concept also 
has the potential to unify certain otherwise disparate aspects of company law and 
insolvency law and public and private company governance. 
 
In conclusion, it will be suggested that some form of value-based signalling in relation 
to the interface of business practice with morality, is essential to the establishment and 
continuing development and maintenance of company directors as „responsible risk 
takers‟. Further, it will be argued that this concept forms a vital element of the wider 
societal compact that is necessary to foster an entrepreneurial culture in which the full 
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spectrum of companies, from the owner-managed private limited company to the 
public company with a full stock exchange listing, are perceived by society as having 
a legitimate „licence to operate‟.6 
 
 
 „NAMING AND SHAMING‟ AND PHOENIX COMPANY DIRECTORS 
 
On attaining office, the former Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs, Nigel 
Griffiths M.P., spearheaded a much publicised campaign against „phoenix directors‟ 
who abuse the privilege of limited liability by trading through successive limited 
companies which fail, leaving unsatisfied creditors in their wake. This is the general 
notion of the phoenix situation and the essential complaint is that traders are utilising 
undercapitalised limited liability companies as a means of insulating themselves from 
the financial repercussions of repeated business failure. Concern over this type of 
activity is by no means new and indeed was commented upon extensively in the Cork 
Report : 
“ It has been made evident to us that there is a widespread 
dissatisfaction at the ease with which a person trading through the 
medium of  one or more companies with limited liability can allow such 
a company to become insolvent, form a new company, and then carry on 
trading much as before, leaving behind him a trail of unpaid creditors, 
and often repeating the process several times. The dissatisfaction is 
greatest where the director of an insolvent company has set up business 
again, using a similar name for the new company, and trades with assets 
purchased at a discount from the liquidator of  the old company.”7 
 
It should be noted that this oft-quoted paragraph refers not only to the general notion 
of the phoenix abuse, but also to the more specific and aggravated practice of setting 
up a new company and trading in the same business with a name similar to that of the 
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insolvent company.  In such a circumstance the controllers of the phoenix company 
have not only sheltered themselves from the full ramifications of the first business 
failure by the use of a limited company, but they have also transferred the value of the 
goodwill attaching to the name of the original business to the new phoenix business  
thereby seeking to misrepresent the credit status of the new business in the eyes of its 
potential creditors. The complexity of the underlying policy issues is demonstrated by 
Parliament‟s response to the Cork Committee‟s recommendations, which was to make 
the use of a similar company name for the phoenix company a criminal offence 
pursuant to section 216 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and to leave the general phoenix 
scenario to fall within the factors to be taken into account by the courts in determining 
whether a director is unfit to act as such, thereby meriting disqualification under the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
 
The case of  J & L Ashworth ( Hardware ) Ltd
8
 illustrates  a typical use of publicity 
sanctions as part of the name and shame campaign. The decision is indicative of the 
wider usage of the phoenix term as the director had been found unfit to be a company 
director pursuant to section six of the Company Directors disqualification Act 1986 on 
the basis, inter alia, that he had 'caused three companies to commence trading in a 
business which had failed previously'. Although the companies were all undertaking 
the same type of business they were not utilising prohibited names, and section 216 of 
the Insolvency Act was thus irrelevant as the companies were not therefore phoenix 
companies in the technical sense. To add to the confusion it should be noted that even 
if a prohibited name had been used there is nevertheless an automatic exemption for 
the phoenix company directors from the operation of section 216 if full consideration 
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is given for all the assets ( including any goodwill attaching to the company name ) 
transferred to the new company ! 
9
 
 
From the above it can be seen that the phenomenon known as the phoenix company is 
not only a subject of much complexity, but is also is the subject of much 
contemporary interest and not simply within the relatively narrow confines of either 
the legal academy or insolvency practitioner circles. As a consequence of the well 
publicised name and shame campaign orchestrated by the Department of Trade and 
Industry the phoenix problem has also been the focus of considerable attention in the 
political and commercial spheres as part of the Government‟s campaign to create a 
actively hostile business environment for rogue directors.
10
  
 
GLOBALISATION, THE THIRD WAY AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
 
Such support for good market practice is unsurprising, as more generally the 
Government has given a high profile to the vital importance of commercial enterprise 
to the U.K., with particular reference to the need to be competitive and flexible in a 
post-Fordist global marketplace with its emphasis on just-in-time delivery; short 
production runs and product quality.
11
 An elaboration of the policy consequences of 
post-Fordism forms a pervasive theme in the white paper issued by the Department of 
Trade and Industry, Our Competitive Future : Building the Knowledge Driven 
Economy.
12
 Examples of the interrelationship of these points can also be found in 
many of the speeches of the Prime Minister, Tony Blair M.P.; see for example the 
speech to the Trades Union Congress ( 9 September 1997 ), where he says of the 
Third Way : 
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...  it starts from a recognition of certain realities about the modern 
world: 
(1) We live in a global economy, where financial irresponsibility by 
Governments leads to immediate punishment from the markets 
(2) There is a technological revolution transforming the workplace and 
production 
(3) Consumer tastes have become varied, highly demanding, expecting 
very high standards of quality and service 
(4) The future of modern developed nations lies in the knowledge and 
information economy 
So mass production is out. Go-it-alone microeconomics is out. Jobs for 
life are probably out. Quality is in. Skills are in. Prudent finance is in. 
We compete in a global economy that is spinning with change.
13
 
 
The import of the these ideas has led to the recognition by the Blair Government of 
various facets of the so-called „competition state‟, which in contrast to the welfare 
state ( which sought to remove certain economic activities from the market ) pursues, 
as Cerny puts it, “ increased marketization in order to make economic activities 
located within the national territory ... more competitive in international and 
transnational terms.”14 However, whilst globalisation is generally perceived as a 
multi-dimensional set of processes capable of both emptying and empowering states, 
New Labour has been accused of taking a significantly more absolutist „hyper-
globalist‟ stance. Following this analysis the role of the state is conceived simply in 
terms of adapting individuals to the economic realities of the global market and 
Government has little choice other than to adopt a minimal regulatory function 
consistent with the broad neo-liberal economic paradigm of the 1980‟s.15  Indeed, this 
view has caused one commentator to lament that, “New Labour now accepts that there 
is simply no alternative to neo-liberalism in an era of heightened capital mobility and 
financial liberalisation - in short in an era of globalisation.”16 
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Accordingly, for New Labour, the new role of Government is to facilitate the 
development of a „knowledge driven economy‟17 ( where ideas, know-how and 
services rather than traditional manufacturing industries are the key to economic 
success ) populated by “serial entrepreneurs”18 in order to maintain national 
prosperity. Indeed, it is in the light of this analysis that New Labour has sought to 
undertake an ambitious reconfiguration of the relationship between the state, the 
private sector and the citizen by adopting a broadly communitarian approach to 
governance, citizenship and regulation.
19
 Whilst the precise nature of the project 
remains vague ( perhaps unsurprisingly given the oft-noted lack of clarity in the 
concept of community that underpins the broad church of communitarian theories )
20
 
the most comprehensive political statement to date ( albeit expressed as work in 
progress ) is to be found in Tony Blair‟s own work, The Third Way : New Politics for 
the New Century ( 1998 ).
21
 Although New Labour‟s central notion of community is 
undoubtedly in part indebted to the responsive communitarian movement in the 
United States
22
 it would seem that the distinctive influence of the domestic 
communitarian heritage and of the Labour Party‟s own political roots should not be 
overlooked.
23
 
 
This project,
24
 is in the words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown 
M.P., to the News International Conference ( 17 July 1998 ), consciously conceived of 
as a „new politics‟ designed to meet the needs of a, “national politics for the global 
marketplace”.25 It is interesting to note that the first order analysis in this speech is 
one of the economic position of the nation in the global economy and that the 
parameters for both domestic economic action and social policy are treated as being 
both exclusively established and severely constrained thereby.  Criticisms have been 
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made of the reality of globalisation in reducing the effective powers of action of the 
nation state and some movement towards greater state regulatory intervention, at least 
at an international level, seems to have been prompted by the South East Asian 
financial crisis. A good summary of the position is given in a subsequent speech by 
Gordon Brown to the Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Ottawa ( 30 September 
1998 ) and entitled, „New Global Structures for a New Global Age‟. The new 
measures proposed to regulate international finance ( with a particular focus upon 
transparency and stability ) and to provide for a code of good practice on social policy 
are of especial interest.
26
 
 
Despite these potential international ramifications, the New Labour communitarian 
project seeks to present a new holistic vision of the individual and society that is very 
much premised upon the concept of the retrenched state in a globalised economy. The 
idea has been labelled the „Third Way‟27 as it attempts to avoid, what are perceived by 
its advocates as, the pitfalls of both the corporatism of the Old Left and the market-
lead neo-liberalism of the New Right.
28
 Hence, the new politics is presented 
rhetorically as a synthesis of ( or, as its progenitors are keen to stress its distinctive 
nature, at least by way of contrast with ) what have been traditionally viewed as a 
series of binary oppositions.
29
 For example, New Labour speeches are  peppered with 
references to the good society and the good economy; enterprise and fairness; 
individualism and community, and it is always stressed that there is no inherent 
tension between the juxtaposed ideas but rather that they are strongly complementary. 
Rather unsurprisingly, the theory underlying this type of articulation has been subject 
to vigorous critique, particularly by members of the more traditional Left of the 
political spectrum such as Stuart Hall, who comments somewhat disparagingly that,  
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“The „Third Way‟ speaks as if there are no longer any conflicting interests which 
cannot be reconciled. It therefore envisages a „politics without adversaries‟. ”30  
 
In any event, the new ground that emerges ( or which may be thought to be in the 
process of emerging as the modernising project is explicitly described as one of 
„permanent revisionism‟ ) is of a society of opportunity and responsibility which 
draws upon, and is informed by, not only traditional socialist ideas of social obligation 
and solidarity but also the core Thatcherite motifs of economic opportunity and 
dynamism. And, as the following extract from the speech of Gordon Brown to the 
News International Conference ( 17 July 1998 ) amply demonstrates, New Labour has 
not been shy to emphasise the vital importance and desirability of the latter ideas : “ 
People say that Mrs Thatcher created an enterprising society. I say there is still not 
enough enterprise and we have to do better. I want Britain to be, in every area, a 
creative innovative and enterprising economy.” 
 
A prime example of this aim is to be found in „Competitiveness UK‟, a concept 
launched by the then President of the Board of Trade, Margaret Beckett M.P., on 4 
June 1997. Mrs Beckett went on to outline her vision of U.K. industrial policy in a 
number of keynote speeches which denoted strong markets, modern companies and an 
entrepreneurial culture as the three pillars which the state, in partnership with other 
interested groups, must foster in order to promote a competitive economy.
 31
 With the 
development of the idea of the knowledge economy by her successors at the 
Department of Trade and Industry the recent policy emphasis has moved to 
capabilities, competition and collaboration.
32
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In particular, as part of a series of policy initiatives centred around „Competitiveness 
UK‟, the Blair Government has proved keen both to stress the key role that small and 
medium sized companies have to play in building an enterprising nation
33
 and to 
undertake a comprehensive review of company law so as to provide a modern 
framework for a modern economy.
34
 These two themes are of some importance in the 
phoenix company context for such companies are invariably small owner-managed 
enterprises. Hence, as the Government encourages the growth of this sector,
35
 by 
seeking to foster a culture
36
 in which many more individuals view it as natural to 
aspire to become risk-taking entrepreneurs,
37
 the phoenix scenario has the potential to 
affect fundamentally a very large and growing number of people whether as victims or 
as perpetrators.
38
 It is thus important that the governing legislative provisions should 
articulate a clear policy which is both accessible and intelligible to this constituency.
39
 
Such transparency is of especial significance given the severity of the sanctions which 
apply to infractions of the complex statutory provisions relevant to the phoenix 
company and this is all the more the case if the Government chooses to maintain a 
policy of naming and shaming those responsible for such transgressions.
40
  
 
THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE BUSINESS : PUBLIC COMPANIES 
 
The Labour Government‟s early stress upon naming and shaming phoenix directors is 
indicative of the fact that the phoenix company problem squarely raises, in terms of 
both the appropriate regulatory mechanisms and the substantive standards to be 
employed, the wider issue of the governance of corporate business. Whilst there has 
been considerable interest in this topic in recent years,
41
 the traditional focus in the 
United Kingdom has been towards a more circumscribed notion of corporate 
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governance conceived primarily in terms of determining the appropriate relationship 
between the board of directors and the shareholders
42
 of a relatively small number of 
quoted public limited companies.
43
 Given the tremendous power that many of these 
companies command such a high level of interest is undoubtedly justified and even 
though this form of corporate governance ( being principally addressed at the 
accountability of publicly traded companies
44
 ) is not directly relevant to the narrow 
phoenix company issue there are certain aspects of the debate which are illustrative of 
the current relationship between the state, business sector and wider community 
towards the governance of business in its broader sense. 
 
In particular, it is acknowledged that the power of publicly traded companies arises 
not simply from the deficit in the level of accountability to their shareholders but 
because such companies are also in an increasingly autonomous position vis-à-vis the 
state due to the opportunities offered by information technology and open capital 
markets for global re-location.
45
 In the light of the latter point it is unsurprising ( 
especially given the wider political scenario previously outlined ) that the corporate 
governance discourse has been conducted primarily in the realm of self-regulation in 
both the domestic
46
 and the international sphere.
47
 Thus, although there is general 
agreement that some state intervention is necessary to provide a basic regulatory 
framework to the market,
48
 the broad thrust of the corporate governance proposals is 
towards the flexibility and dynamism of self-regulation and to an invocation of a neo-
liberal minimal state that will not place what are perceived as unnecessary hurdles in 
the way of wealth creation.
49
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At present it is widely acknowledged that the precise form and scope of the 
governance mechanisms of any system of self-regulation will need to map the specific 
culture of the host state
50
 and it would seem that there is general acceptance ( at least 
in the UK business world ) of two core ideas central to the Anglo-American paradigm 
: that a company‟s primary mission is to generate returns for the present and future 
shareholders and that the shareholders‟ rights are derived squarely from their private 
property interest in a company.
51
 It follows that in one sense the effect of adopting  a 
system of self-regulation in the UK which acknowledges the investors and directors as 
the principal legitimate actors in the company ( thereby severely de-limiting the role 
of the state and other stakeholders in the formal governance process ) has been to 
privilege a „privatised‟52 view of the publicly traded company.53 However, 
simultaneously and paradoxically, due not only to the employment of the twin 
principles of disclosure and accountability but due also to the desire to pre-empt state 
intervention,
54
 another dimension arising from the use of self-regulation has been the 
placement of the governance debate firmly within the public sphere. 
 
Clearly the adoption of a „pluralist model‟ as opposed to the present „enlightened 
shareholder value model‟ would  formally create a focused arena of a distinctive legal 
nature for public discussion concerning the business practice of company directors.
55
  
Such an approach would appear to resonate with the influential Royal Society of Arts 
Inquiry, Tomorrow’s Company ( 1995 ) which commends corporations to take an 
inclusive approach to business, emphasising notions of partnership and 
interconnectedness with other stakeholders, in order to both maintain their „licence to 
operate‟ and maximise their long term sustainable profitability to present and future 
shareholders.
56
 However, although the Department of Trade and Industry review 
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recognises that the present fiduciary duties require an inclusive approach, it clearly 
and categorically limits this duty to the latter objective.
57
 
 
In very crude terms the privatised axis is at present thus constituted as the dominant 
formal mode of discourse and is thus privileged over the public limb of 
„inclusiveness‟ attaching to the notion of the „licence to operate‟ which, in a formal 
legal sense, languishes barely distinguishable within its shadow ( a fact which is 
undoubtedly exacerbated by the confusion within the enlightened shareholder model 
between short-termist and inclusive approaches ).
58
 However, on this axis it is the pre-
emptive principle of self-regulation which ironically has thrown certain substantive 
business operations open for debate in the civic arena, for it permits and necessitates a 
discourse concerning the business practice of going concern companies as a means of 
legitimating and sustaining their societal „licence to operate‟. 
 
A prime example of this shift in the UK, which bears a close affinity to the name and 
shame campaign over rogue directors, is the ongoing public debate over levels of 
executive pay.
59
 The topic of so-called „fat cat‟ salaries, in particular in relation to 
senior executives of privatised industries such as Cedric Brown, Chairman of British 
Gas plc, has been constantly in the press in the last decade. Such pressures led to self-
regulation through disclosure of information pursuant to the recommendations of an 
industry group contained in Directors’ Remuneration : Report of a Study Group 
Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury ( 1995 ). However, it would appear that the 
recommendations contained in The Greenbury Report may not be sufficient to 
forestall legislative intervention requiring shareholder approval of directors‟ 
remuneration levels if, as Stephen Byers put it in his speech to the P.I.R.C. Annual 
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Corporate Governance Conference ( 23 March 1999 ), “best practice does not succeed 
in delivering a greater link between pay and performance.” Subsequently, the topic has 
received an extended analysis in D.T.I. Consultation Document Directors’ 
Remuneration ( July 1999 ), where the Government has indicated its preference for the 
above measure together with the creation of new procedures to enable shareholders to 
move a resolution on directors‟ remuneration at the annual general meeting of the 
company.
60
 
 
THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE BUSINESS : PRIVATE COMPANIES 
 
By way of contrast, the governance of private companies
61
 is a subject which is rarely 
examined or even directly acknowledged as a field of enquiry in such terms.
62
 Indeed, 
such companies have been traditionally placed for analytical purposes within a much 
more discrete frame of reference than listed public companies. This strongly private 
perspective is reinforced by a factual backdrop where there is rarely a separation of 
ownership and control as, unlike the majority of listed public companies, the owner-
managers of a private company will almost invariably own or control the majority, if 
not all, of the share capital and voting rights of the company. Thus, as the small 
private company is viewed as being distinctively within the private sphere
63
, the 
analytical perspective associated with it has largely disregarded any broader civic, 
ethical or socio-political analysis, at least in relation to the ongoing governance of a 
company‟s business. Hence, the widely held view of corporate practitioners is that 
unanimous shareholder ratification is a near universal panacea at common law for any 
internal corporate irregularities ( of a civil nature ) arising in a solvent private 
company. The strong notion of shareholders as the utilisers of their own private 
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property has undoubtedly been influential to this end, as one commentator has recently 
put it : “Ownership ... served to legitimate the corporate form itself. So long as it was 
owned by individuals the economic and political power of the company was both 
benign and a bulwark against the intrusion of the state.”64 
 
Clearly such sentiments were well fitted to the prevailing neo-liberal political and 
economic culture that characterised the majority of the Thatcherite era and in which 
the power of the state was in theory to be retrenched in order to allow maximum 
economic autonomy to individuals.
65
 Accordingly, the extensive disquisition on the 
private limited company ( which itself was strongly associated with this 
entrepreneurial freedom ) in the last twenty years tends to have been conducted by 
way of a discussion of the appropriate facilitative structures to be adopted, in terms of 
de-regulation initiatives and by way of an otherwise relatively discrete and technical 
legalistic discourse.
66
 It is not obvious that this position will change, for whilst the 
company law review does consider private company governance issues both in the 
context of the scope of company law and in its own right, the former is considered 
largely irrelevant ( within the context adopted ) and the latter is primarily conceived in 
structural and facilitative terms.
67
 
 
However, whatever the formal analytical legal position, as has been frequently noted, 
the putative corrosive tendency of untrammelled free markets within a desired 
minimal state has the paradoxical effect of enhancing the need for regulation,
68
 
whether sponsored by the state or in the form of self-regulation. Further the regulatory 
processes employed are capable of thereby producing a “complex set of legal fields”69 
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in which it is not always easy to maintain transparency or to co-ordinate overall policy 
as each of the fields becomes more juridified and path-specific over time. 
 
In particular, a high level of state intervention and regulation is found to be justified 
on the occasion of business failure ( especially, as is the case for the overwhelming 
number of private companies, where the peculiar attribute of limited liability is 
involved ). It is primarily at this stage, since the legislative reforms of the mid-1980 s, 
that the enclosed world of the private company is torn open and submitted to a 
retrospective judicial and public scrutiny by way of the insolvency, and where 
appropriate, disqualification processes. The considerable body of new jurisprudence 
that has thereby arisen has resulted in a dissonance between the traditional prospective 
rules of business behaviour required, which, in terms of the standard of skill and care 
expected of directors, tend to have reflected a laissez faire approach whereby private 
actors are permitted a wide field of discretion, and the much more interventionist rules 
reflecting the public interest that are applied ex post facto on business failure.
70
  
 
Hence, although the judicial treatment of issues in respect of this facet of the 
governance of the private company sector has not traditionally been imbued with a 
strong prophylactic aspect at common law, it may be argued that such an approach is 
increasingly to be found, to (mis)use Maine‟s famous phrase, “hidden in the 
interstices of procedure” ( or in more modern parlance the designated fields of 
regulation ) arising on business failure.
71
 In fact this outcome is not too surprising 
given the Thatcher Government‟s deliberate restructuring of the insolvency regime by 
licensing its operation to a new professional monopoly of insolvency practitioners and 
creating new punitive sanctions pursuant to the wrongful trading and disqualification 
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regimes. Thus, it is undoubtedly the case that these major reforms were initiated in 
order both to police and to legitimate the market as a social ( rather than simply an 
economic ) institution.
72
 
 
GOVERNANCE BY CULTURE 
A valuable aspect of New Labour‟s name and shame campaign therefore lies in its 
capacity to render explicit in the public domain the prospective dimensions of private 
company governance, thus facilitating the unification of the rules and values that have 
grown up ( seemingly with scant reference to each other ) in the two fields of 
regulation discussed above around the more objective test applied on corporate 
failure.
73
 Further, it is also suggested that the effect of the name and shame policy 
would be likely to be enhanced if there was a statutory statement of the duty of skill 
and care clearly setting out the appropriate duty.
74
 The duty would require to be stated 
in sufficiently flexible terms yet nevertheless be sufficiently clear to provide practical 
guidance. It is suggested that a similar provision to section 214 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 ( as interpreted by Knox J in Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. No 2 
75
 ) is 
desirable. In broad terms, pursuant to this test a director is expected to display the 
general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person 
performing the same functions as the director in a similar company ( the objective 
limb ) in addition to applying any specific expertise that he/she may have ( the 
subjective limb ). It is pleasing to note that this is the option recently recommended by 
the Law Commissions Report, Company Directors : Regulating Conflicts of Interests 
and Formulating a Statement of Duties .
76
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It is submitted that the transparency generated by these twin policy initiatives would 
have the benefit of promoting both a more general awareness and a deeper 
understanding of the responsibilities of a contemporary company director within 
society and thereby of reducing existing levels of confusion or ignorance on the topic. 
In addition, a public space would be created in which the appropriate governance 
principles for corporate business activities could be forged and elucidated.
77
 As this 
task is central to the maintenance of the broad compact between companies, the 
multifarious corporate actors ( principally comprising of a company‟s directors, 
employees, creditors and consumers ) and the wider society, which constitutes the 
corporate licence to operate there would seem to be no good reason why such a duty 
of skill and care should not also apply to the directors of publicly traded companies,
78
 
thus fusing the approach taken to this aspect of the governance of corporate business 
around this central pillar of ideas. 
 
Such a stance in relation to the duty of skill and care is not one that has recommended 
itself to the judiciary who have traditionally eschewed any strong standard setting role 
in order to preserve an appropriate zone of business discretion, see for example the 
dictum of Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd.
79
 : “There 
is no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law : nor will courts of 
law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of 
management honestly arrived at.” Such a position is surely correct, it is clearly not for 
the courts to be engaged in the practice of running companies. However, as the recent 
decisions pursuant to the disqualification legislation indicate the courts are 
nevertheless clearly engaged in at least setting the bounds of acceptable commercial 
behaviour.
80
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However, the advent of Peter Mandelson M.P. as the Secretary of State at the 
Department of Trade and Industry undoubtedly resulted in a further elaboration of the 
contours of the debate over the governance of corporate business in this respect when 
he directly raised the importance of  societal attitudes and especially chose to stress 
the need to encourage the entrepreneurial spirit  : 
 
We need to examine all our regulatory systems to ensure that they do 
not needlessly deter our entrepreneurs ... Are we sure that they create 
confidence in enterprise and commerce ? I don‟t think we are 
confident. I think we need fundamentally to re-assess our attitude in 
Britain to business failure. Rather than condemning it and discouraging 
anyone from risking failure, we need to encourage entrepreneurs to 
take further risks in the future.
81
 
 
Such rhetoric has attracted a good deal of criticism due to its open-ended nature and at 
first blush certainly seems to run against the Department of Trade and Industry‟s 
policy of naming and shaming rogue directors who have transgressed the bounds of 
acceptable commercial behaviour.
82
  However, from subsequent events it is clear that 
the sentiments expressed are part of a considered policy initiative which expressly 
looks to future law reform to improve corporate rescue procedures and to reduce the 
stigma of financial failure.
83
  
 
The next Secretary of State at the Department of Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers 
M.P., has maintained the momentum whilst introducing a new character to replace 
Mr. Mandelson‟s „serial entrepreneur‟ : the director as a „responsible risk taker‟. It is 
suggested that this construct offers a rich linguistic resource
84
 which may be drawn 
upon to develop a nuanced view of the company director‟s role and the pervasive 
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interface with business practice and morality.  Indeed, Stephen Byers has sought to do 
just this : 
To foster a climate of responsible risk taking, we must also tackle 
head-on the stigma attached to business failure in this country. At 
present our bankruptcy laws make no distinction between the 
responsible risk taker and those individuals who deliberately set out to 
cheat their creditors or abuse the system.
85
 
 
Thus it is clear that for New Labour the notion of the company director as a 
responsible risk taker is central to the governance of business operations and to the 
maintenance of the corporate „licence to operate‟ in the emerging global knowledge 
economy of contemporary informational societies.
86
 What remain unclear are the 
institutional structures and processes by which the concept of the responsible risk 
taker will be fleshed out.   
 
GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE BUSINESS IN THE  
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
 
Returning to the theme of private limited companies, it is indeed unsurprising that 
Government thinking should be orientated in the direction discussed above, as the 
dynamism of the SME sector and its ability to develop the positive aspects of risk
87
 
are frequently stated by New Labour to be central to the development of the 
knowledge economy necessary to compete in the global marketplace. Following the 
New Labour model it would seem that these twin pressures have brought about the 
need for economic restructuring so as to encourage small adaptive structures working 
in a bottom-up fashion in order to foster the necessary creativity and flexibility.
88
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Such thinking has led the Future Unit of the Department of Trade and Industry to 
develop two scenarios ( which although not constituting an official statement of policy 
nevertheless will form a conscious aspect of Departmental decision making ) for the 
business world of the knowledge economy : „built to last‟ and „wired world‟.89 The 
former scenario envisages the dominance of large corporations ( whose financial 
might will provide secure careers, good research and development facilities, structures 
to capture know-how and to exploit brands ), whilst the latter more favoured model ( 
picking up the current trend of business growth in the SME sector ) posits a 
constellation of trust based networks of SMEs. It is acknowledged that the reality is 
likely to be an amalgam of the two positions but it is important to note that such an 
eventuality has significant structural implications, as Castells has put it: 
 “Under the conditions of fast technological change, networks not firms, 
have become the actual operating unit. In other words, ... a new 
organizational form has emerged as characteristic of the informational 
global economy: the network enterprise.
90
  
 
In such circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that there is concern that the 
traditional means of corporate governance ( with their reliance upon the 
director/shareholder relationship within individual companies ) are proving inadequate 
and that there is a much greater emphasis upon governance by way of business 
culture, in terms both of directors‟ practice and the relationship between companies 
and society. 
 
Concomitant upon the above, it is New Labour‟s current view that the key to a 
Government‟s success lies not in stakeholding,91 at least in the monolithic and 
corporatist manner in which it is generally conceived,
92
 but in the more institutionally 
flexible and politically malleable notion of partnership. As such the stakeholding idea, 
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which was launched in Tony Blair‟s Singapore speech ( 8 January 1996 ) as an 
organising principle of New Labour, has now been supplanted in this respect by the 
Third Way. Will Hutton gives a spirited defence of stakeholding against the charges 
set out above and defends the relevance of the concept : “stakeholding represents the 
political economy that New Labour lacks to support its value and vision of the „Third 
Way‟.”93  However, whilst Hutton fervently believes that stakeholding constitutes, 
“the only current, practical way of pursuing progressive politics”, he is forced to 
conclude regretfully that as, “[s]takeholding is one more expression of European 
social market capitalism; it will only succeed within an overall European framework 
constructed to defend the European model.”94 As an indigenous idea to the U.K. 
stakeholding, therefore, seems dead. It seems unlikely that the company law review 
will mark an explicit re-vitalisation of the concept ( even if it is re-badged as the 
„pluralist model‟ and applied principally in relation to publicly traded companies ) in 
the U.K. corporate sphere. 
 
By employing the new term „partnership‟, New Labour is not, of course, seeking to 
limit the meaning to the legal definition of the concept but rather to use the word in its 
wide generic sense.
 95
 Such partnerships are consciously promoted as a means of 
delivering goods or services that would be considered too interventionist and 
expensive for the retrenched modern state alone.
96
 However, the reconfiguration of the 
relationship between the state, business and the wider community that is thereby 
entailed has had the effect of blurring the traditional boundaries between the public 
and the private domain, and thereby of public and private law. In particular, there is 
some concern that the private law of contract is not an adequate vehicle by which to 
ensure representation of the public interest or to determine accountability.
97
 Further, 
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this is a matter which especially resonates in corporate law where there is a long 
heritage of suspicion of the private power wielded by corporations and it would seem 
that the question of corporate legitimacy will again come to the fore as a consequence 
of the greater concentration of erstwhile public power in ostensibly private entities.
98
 
 
In addition, the broader governance problems raised by the multi-level interpenetrated 
formal and informal structures arising are notoriously difficult and complex.
99
  
Further, it would seem that, as public-private partnerships become more widespread, 
there is a real danger that some of the positive public service values of the traditional 
public sector will be eroded
100
 ( or at the least disappear from sight, which may have a 
similar effect ). Rather disturbingly, when this factor is combined with a vigorous 
constellation of SMEs with a high sensitivity ( and doubtless antipathy ) to regulatory 
intervention,
101
 the commercial environment becomes one in which there is a 
considerable risk of a governance vacuum.  
 
In such a structural context it may be argued that there will be potentially a significant 
role for what has been termed  „moral intervention‟102 : i.e. the use of publicity 
sanctions by the state, as part of an orchestrated campaign to reinforce, inform or help 
determine the social values of market actors, as an alternative or supplementary, and 
relatively inexpensive, method of governance of the corporate business sector. Once 
again the notion of the responsible risk taker may be utilised as the attitudinal 
touchstone by which the delicate balance between innovation and propriety may be 
drawn. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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That the importance of developing an appropriate entrepreneurial culture is central to 
New Labour‟s approach to the governance of corporate business  is well evidenced by 
Peter Mandelson‟s plea for, “ ... an enterprise-orientated, risk-taking, failure-tolerant 
business culture that enables you constantly to innovate and constantly adapt to 
changing economic conditions ....”103  However, whilst these facets are deemed 
essential within the globalised knowledge-driven economy of network enterprises 
which characterise the Blair Government‟s political economy, that very same market 
situation also demands that the actors therein are subject to governance in order to 
maintain both its own integrity, and the legitimacy of such actors within the context of 
the wider society. It is suggested that these contradictory requirements are 
encompassed within the notion of the responsible risk taker and that this concept has 
the ability to fuse otherwise disparate strands within corporate governance and 
company and insolvency law.   
 
Further, given New Labour‟s view of the structural changes wrought by globalising 
processes and the reconfiguration of the relationship between business, state and 
community thereby entailed, it is clear that the Government has a preference for self 
regulation or regulation through culture.
 104
 Such a device in terms of the governance 
of company directors may be seen as quite an encroachment into the what liberalism 
would describe as the private arena of the economic world. This is explicitly 
recognised by New labour politicians, so ( for example ) Stephen Byers is quite 
conscious that in determining the appropriate balance for the responsible risk taker, 
“we will be talking about the values that go to the very heart of the societies in which 
we live.”105 This factor has led many commentators to worry about the potentially 
authoritarian nature of New Labour‟s communitarianism and, as Ireland succinctly 
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puts it there would seem to be a real danger that, “[u]nable to regulate the economy, 
the Party can be expected to regulate people instead.”106  
 
Whilst alternative political and regulatory models are available in relation to a more 
positive and less authoritarian use of name and shame sanctions ,
107
 it is clearly 
evident from the example provided by phoenix companies that the mapping of 
morality and business regulation is in any event by no means straightforward.
108
 
Nevertheless, in conclusion, it would seem that the responsible risk taker motif does 
offer a useful starting point for discussion, and that a rigid distinction between the 
economic, social and political realm is increasingly more untenable : it will be 
interesting to see how the debate evolves.
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regulation such as that which pertains for the governance of quoted companies in the UK concerns have 
been expressed that too much stress has been given to accountability to the detriment of enterprise see 
e.g. the Hampel Report, para. 1.1 and H. Short et al., „Corporate Governance, Accountability and 
Enterprise‟ ( 1998 ) 6 Corporate Governance 151. More generally the minimisation of structural 
impediments to economic growth would seem to be one of the intended functions of the new 
Productivity and Competitiveness Cabinet Committee announced in Our Competitive Future, para. 5.5. P
st-
P
i t
35 
                                                                                                                                            
50
 See the preamble to the O.E.C.D. Report and the Hampel Report, para. 1.4. For a comparative survey 
of  the corporate governance systems in five states and the effect of the „distinctive nature of each 
country‟s culture, history and institutions‟ thereon see J. Charkham, Keeping Good Company ( 1995 ) 
and K. Lannoo, „A European Perspective on Corporate Governance‟ ( 1999 ) 37 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 269. An excellent historical comparative survey charting the significance of political 
culture in constituting corporate governance structures is given in Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak 
Owners : the Political Roots of American Corporate Finance ( 1994 ). On this theme see also D. A. 
Skeel Jr., „An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy‟ ( 1998 ) 51 
Vanderbilt Law Rev. 1325 who offers a stimulating discussion of the pressures exerted by the local 
corporate insolvency regime on the form of governance mechanisms adopted in different jurisdictions. 
The intersection with globalisation at this juncture is perhaps worth noting as the above analysis would 
suggest that the business elite of the new world order is not, at least yet, operating within a „hybridised‟ 
extra-territorial top culture but remains firmly rooted in praxis by the history and parameters offered by 
local/regional business culture : cf. Z. Bauman, Globilization : The Human Consequences ( 1998 ). 
51
 See the Hampel Report, paras. 1.16 -1.18 and, in favour of the two principles generally, A. Alcock, 
„Corporate Governance : A Defence of the Status Quo‟ ( 1995 ) 58 Modern Law Rev. 898 and the 
O.E.C.D. Advisory Report, ch. 2. The role of the institutional shareholder is thus viewed as increasingly 
central, see e.g. Robert A. G. Monks, The Emperor’s Nightingale ( 1998 ) who argues that investor 
activism ( albeit conceived through a new language of sustainability which engages with other 
stakeholders interests ) forms the principal practical and legitimate axis of corporate governance. For a 
critique of this viewpoint arguing for the recognition of the corporation, “as a network of social and 
productive relationships” and “... the replacement of private, shareholder-centred mechanisms by more 
democratic, social mechanisms of governance...” see P. Ireland, op.  cit. n. 42, at p. 56 and, in the same 
vein, J. Maltby & R. Wilkinson, „Stakeholding and Corporate Governance in the UK‟ ( 1998 ) 18 
Politics 197. In any event, the extent to which governance by investor activism can be utilised  in 
structurally and culturally inimicable environments would appear limited even in the case of very 
sophisticated investor institutions, see further T.J. André, Jr., „Cultural Hegemony : The Exportation of 
Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany‟ ( 1998 ) 73 Tulane Law Rev. 69. It is Po
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interesting to note that the use of adverse publicity is suggested therein as one of the more effective 
ways in which such investors could influence the governance agenda,  id., p. 171. 
52
 I.e. in contradistinction to a public or societal contextual perspective. When combined with economic 
globalisation such a framework has profound implications for the very existence of civil society and 
democratic structures : see further U. Beck, Democracy Without Enemies ( 1998 ) ch. 5 and R. 
Dahrendorf, „A Precarious Balance: Economic Opportunity, Civil Society, and Political Liberty‟ in The 
Essential Communitarian Reader,  ed.  A. Etzioni ( 1998 ) 73.  
53
 Hence, whilst the Hampel Report recognises that good governance requires all the company‟s 
constituencies to be taken into account by the board with the objective of enhancing the shareholders‟ 
investment ( paras. 1.3, 1.16 & 1.18 ) the point is made most strongly that although the board is 
responsible for relations with stakeholders it is accountable only to shareholders ( para. 1.17 ). A 
similar position is set out in the O.E.C.D. Report, principles III and V. The Hampel Report states the 
reason for this distinction to be that if a multi-fiduciary duty was imposed on the board it would be 
impossible to find an appropriate benchmark against which to evaluate board decisions thereby 
perversely making directors even less accountable : for a vigorous academic defence of this argument 
see E. Sternberg, „The Defects of Stakeholder Theory‟ ( 1997 ) 5 Corporate Governance 3 ( but cf. J. 
Parkinson, op.  cit. n. 41, and the essays in L. E. Mitchell (ed.), Progressive Corporate Law ( 1995 ) 
which provide a more positive evaluation of various multi-fiduciary models ). For a concise discussion 
of a range of governance paradigms in the corporate sphere see D. P. Sullivan & D. E. Conlon, „Crisis 
and Transition in Corporate Governance Paradigms : The Role of the Chancery Court of Delaware‟ ( 
1997 ) 31 Law & Society Rev. 713, 714-720 and The Strategic Framework Document, ch. 5.1. 
54
 See e.g. C. Villiers, „Self Regulatory Corporate Governance - Final Hope or Last Rites ? „ ( 1998 ) 13 
Scottish Law & Practice Quarterly 208, especially at pp. 224-225. 
55
 These models are discussed as one of the central issues for examination in The Strategic Framework 
Document, ch. 5.1. 
56
 This stance is also well illustrated by the O.E.C.D. Advisory Report ( ch. 7 ) which, whilst explicitly 
recognising the validity of societal interests and the role of corporate citizenship ( ch. 7.6 ), nevertheless 
concludes by emphasising the  pre-eminence of the shareholders‟ interests ( para. 143 ). 
57
 See The Strategic Framework Document, paras. 5.1.19, 5.1.12 & 5.1.28 respectively. 
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58
 Id., paras. 5.1.12 & 5.1.20. 
59
 For a substantive discussion of the issues see C. Villiers, „Executive Pay: Beyond Control ?‟ ( 1995 ) 
15 Legal Studies 260 and B. R. Cheffins, Company Law : Theory, Structure and Operation ( 1997 ) 
ch.14.  For an example of a name and shame table on the topic, see The Guardian , 19 July 1999. 
60
 See paras. 7.17 and 7.23 respectively. 
61
 Governance here is used in a general regulatory sense. 
62
 Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 provides a potential forum for airing such matters especially 
as a wide ambit has been given to the concept of unfair prejudice ( particularly through supplementing 
the company constitution by reference to equitable constraints manifested by a member‟s legitimate 
expectations ) by analogy with Lord Wilberforce‟s reasoning in Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd [ 
1973 ] A.C.  360. However, such expectations have been expressly stated to be inapplicable to listed 
public companies in Re Astec ( BSR ) plc [ 1999 ] B.C.C. 59, at p. 87D per  Jonathan Parker J and 
recent decisions have been more restrictive in tenor even in the context of quasi-partnership companies, 
see especially Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc [ 1995 ] 1 B.C.L.C. 14 ( though cf. Re BSB Holdings 
Ltd. ( No 2 ) [ 1996 ] 1 B.C.L.C. 155, at p. 243e per Arden J ) and O’Neill v. Phillips [ 1999 ] B.C.C. 
600. In any event, the fact that the section concerns shareholder disagreements has given it a trajectory 
towards the resolution of specific private disputes with the result that the judges, in sharp contrast to  
the disqualification cases where the provisions are squarely informed by the public interest, seem to be 
chary of making generalised statements on governance in this arena e.g. in terms of a director‟s duty of 
skill and care the courts have only very cautiously accepted that serious mismanagement might 
potentially constitute unfair prejudice : see Re Elgindata Ltd. [ 1991 ] B.C.L.C. 959 and Re Macro ( 
Ipswich ) Ltd. [ 1994 ] 2 B.C.L.C. 354.  See further on the relationship between s. 459 and respectively, 
corporate governance principles and the common law duty of care and skill, S. Copp & R. Goddard, 
„Corporate Governance Principles on Trial‟ ( 1998 ) 19 The Company Lawyer 277 and A. Boyle, „ The 
Common Law Duty of Care and Enforcement Under s.459‟  ( 1996 ) 17 The Company Lawyer 83. 
63
 Whilst this characterisation may be said to be true of company law as a whole it is often argued that 
corporate law has a strong public law character ( particularly in relation to public companies ), see e.g. 
K. Greenfield, „From Rights to Regulation in Corporate Law‟ in Perspectives on Company Law : 2, ed. 
F. Patfield ( 1997 ) 1. Indeed the overall position of corporate law on the public /private spectrum is 
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very complex and multifaceted as well as being historically contingent, see generally Hendrik Hartog, 
„Because All the World was Not New York City : Governance, Property Rights, and the State in the 
Changing Definition of a Corporation, 1730-1860‟ ( 1979 ) 28 Buffalo Law Rev. 91 and D. Sugarman, 
„Is Company Law Founded on Contract or Public Regulation ? The Law Commission‟s Paper on 
Company Directors‟ ( 1999 ) 20 The Company Lawyer 162. Such complexity is further evidenced by 
the lack of precise „fit‟ with contemporary contractarian and communitarian debates in corporate 
theory, e.g. see the lengthy argument in P. Cox, „The Public, The Private and The Corporation‟ ( 1997 ) 
80 Marquette Law Rev. 393. See also W. Bratton Jr.,‟Public Values, Private Business, and US 
Corporate Fiduciary Law‟ in op.  cit. n. 41, eds. J. McCahery et al. 23, who acknowledges the various 
dimensions at play and therefore posits a mediative role for corporate law as a situs for dialogue 
between the private internal business values of the corporate actor and wider public community values. 
64
 R. Grantham, „The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders‟ ( 1998 ) 57 Cambridge 
Law Journal 554, at p. 554. Whilst Grantham is at pains to note that, due to the unitary nature of 
company law at a formal level, his wider argument, that legal doctrine has come to recognise that the 
shareholders have ceased to have any meaningful ownership claims over the company, technically 
applies just as much to quasi-partnership companies as to listed companies, he is clearly uncomfortable 
with this conclusion as  matter of substance, id., at pp. 556-7. 
65
 For an exposition of this view connecting it with political freedom in a similar manner to Hayek and 
Friedman, see P. Minford, op.  cit. n. 48 . For a more critical appraisal see K. Faulks, op.  cit. n. 25, chs. 
4 and 5 and J. Kay, op.  cit. n. 42, ch. 15. 
66
  An excellent review of the literature is given by J. Freedman, „Small Businesses and the Corporate 
Form : Burden or Privilege ?‟ ( 1994 ) 57 Modern Law Rev. 555; A. Hicks, „Corporate Form: 
Questioning The Unsung Hero‟ [1997] Journal of Business Law 306 and D. Sugarman, 
„Reconceptualising Company Law : Reflections Upon the Law Commission‟s Consultation Paper on 
Shareholder Remedies ; Part I‟ ( 1997 ) 18 The Company Lawyer 226, at pp. 233-237. 
67
 See The Strategic Framework Document, paras. 5.1.48 & 5.2.19 - 5.2.35. 
68
 See e.g. D. Sugarman, op. cit. n. 66, at pp. 230-231; J. Gray, op.  cit. n. 15 , ch. 2; J. Braithwaite, 
Crime, Shame and Reintegration ( 1989 ) 171 and M. Power, The Audit Society (1997 ), especially ch. 
3 : it also leads to deep tensions within the neo-liberal theoretical account, see further A. Giddens, op.  
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cit. n. 12, at pp. 33-41. For a specific application to corporate affairs see S. Wheeler, „Directors‟ 
Disqualification: Insolvency Practitioners and the Decision-Making Process‟ ( 1995  ) 15  Legal Studies 
283, at pp. 287-290. 
69
 D. Sugarman, op. cit. n. 66, at p. 233. Whilst this comment was made in the specific context of the 
financial markets the author thereafter speaks generally of, “the complex dialectic of regulation, 
deregulation and re-regulation - of private and public law - which has characterised the regulation of 
companies, both public and private.” id. ( footnote omitted ). For an illustration of this dialectic in 
company law see the detailed legal and economic analysis provided by the Law Commissions in 
Company Directors : Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties ( 1998; 
Law Com. Consultation Paper No. 153; Scot. Law Com. Discussion Paper No. 105 ) and D. Sugarman, 
op.  cit. n. 63. 
70
 See e.g. the contrast between what is expected of a director according to the traditional approach in 
Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd. [ 1910 ] 1 Ch. 425 and Re City Equitable Fire 
Assurance Co. Ltd. [ 1925 ] Ch. 407 and the modern approach which is much more prepared to engage 
in standard setting as demonstrated in Re D’Jan of London Ltd. [ 1994 ] 1 B.C.L.C. 561. Whilst all 
these cases concern business failure, the earlier cases were undoubtedly decided against a background 
that was succinctly set out by Lord MacNaughten as follows, “I do not think it is desirable for any 
tribunal to do that which Parliament has abstained from doing - that is, to formulate precise rules for the 
guidance or embarrassment of business men in the conduct of business affairs” : Dovey v. Corey [1901] 
A.C. 477, at p. 488. This rationale, and the lax prospective trajectory it suggests, were clearly fractured 
in favour of a more ex post interventionist approach with the enactment of both the wrongful trading 
provisions contained in section 214 Insolvency Act 1986 and, as Lord Hoffmann noted in Bishopsgate 
Investment Management Ltd. v. Maxwell ( No 2 ) [ 1994 ] 1 All ER 261, at p. 264b ( C. A. ), the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. For Lord Hoffmann‟s reconsidered position of the effect 
of this legislation upon directors‟ duties of skill and care see n. 78. 
71
 E.g. in the context of the disqualification jurisdiction see the tenor of the judgments in Re Continental 
Assurance Co of London plc [ 1996 ] B.C.C. 888; Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd [ 1998] 2 All ER 
124 and Re Barings plc ( No 5 ) [ 1999 ] 1 B.C.L.C. 433. 
72
 See further T. C. Halliday & B.C. Carruthers, op. cit. n. 5. 
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73
 The fiduciary duties of company directors are also, of course, thereby brought into a public 
regulatory space. 
74
 See J. Braithwaite, op.  cit. n.  68, at p. 79. 
75
 [ 1989 ] B.C.L.C. 520. 
76
 1999; Cm. 4436; SE/1999/25 :  Part 5. For a succinct critique see Hon. Justice Santow, „Codification 
of Directors‟ Duties‟ ( 1999 ) 73 Australian Law J. 336. 
77
 J. Braithwaite, op. cit.  n. 68, ch. 9. 
78
 By way of contrast, the governance dichotomy between private and publicly traded companies 
evinced by the traditional stance in the UK is well evidenced by Lord Hoffmann‟s discussion in the 
Fourth Annual Leonard Sainer Lecture : “ ... while the Brazilian Rubber Plantations rule is concerned 
principally with the relationship between the directors and the shareholders, the disqualification rules 
are concerned with the relationship between the directors and the proprietors of the business on the one 
side and their creditors on the other.” ( 1997 ) 18 The Company Lawyer 194, at p. 197. 
79
 [ 1974 ] A.C. ( P.C. ) 821, at p. 832 E-F. 
80
 See the cases cited in n. 71 , and for the development of this point in relation to the Insolvency Act 
1986 and Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, see T.C. Halliday and B. G. Carruthers, op. 
cit. n. 5. 
81
 See the New York  Speech. In order to produce the desired change to the agenda the positive aspects 
of the entrepreneur clearly had to be stressed to the exclusion of the more negative issues connected 
with the idea : the concept itself perhaps remains underdeveloped, see further  n. 83. 
82
  E.g. see City Commentary, The Times, 16 October 1998. The tone of the D.T.I. press releases in the 
name and shame campaign certainly changed thereafter so as to stress the positive facets of the 
company director as an entrepreneur. 
83
 E.g. see the subsequent speech to the CBI in London ( 2 November 1998 ); the integrated approach 
set out in the Chancellor‟s Pre-Budget Report ( November 1998 ) ch. 3, especially paras. 3.46-3.48 and 
Our Competitive Future, paras. 2.12-2.14. The latter‟s conception of the entrepreneur is very similar in 
approach to the O.E.C.D.‟s position as set out in Fostering Entrepreneurship ( 1998 ); for a stimulating 
alternative vision that rejects the Cartesian model of the entrepreneur in favour of a practically based 
dialogical model ( drawn from the later works of Heidegger‟s philosophy ) whereby individuals use 
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their „history making skills‟ to transform „disclosive spaces‟ see C. Spinoza et al., Disclosing New 
Worlds : Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity ( 1997 ), especially 
ch. 2. 
84
 Though one which is also imbued with difficulties given that both risk and responsibility are 
sometimes rather imponderable concepts in a world of „manufactured risk‟, see further A. Giddens, 
„Risk and Responsibility‟ ( 1999 ) 62 Modern Law Rev. 1.  
85
 Extracted from the Mansion House Speech. See further, „Fostering Enterprise : the American 
Experience‟ the Report of the U.K.-U.S. Conference on Entrepreneurship ( 2 July 1999 ). 
86
 On informational societies, see M. Castells, op. cit. n. 12, vol. 1, passim. 
87
 For a broad discussion and the possible origins of the responsible risk taker motif see A. Giddens, op.  
cit. n.  27, especially at pp. 63-64 and 99-100. 
88
 Though not so explicitly stated this would seem to be the import of the London Business School 
Speech. As a matter of broader social theory the fragmentation of civil society evidenced by the 
proliferation of interest groups is perhaps one of the key elements of Beck‟s notion of 
„individualization‟ : see U. Beck, The Risk Society ( 1992 ) Part II, especially ch. 5. In the political 
domain further elaboration is given through the concept of „sub-politics‟ in the same author‟s The 
Reinvention of Politics ( 1997 ).  
89
 D.T.I. : Work in the Knowledge-Driven Economy ( August 1999 ). 
90
 M. Castells, op. cit. n. 12, vol. 1, ch. 3 at p. 171. See also C. Leadbeater, op. cit. n. 12 , passim. 
91
 See further on the diverse notions of stakeholding, G. Kelly et al. ( eds. ), Stakeholder Capitalism ( 
1997 ); S. Driver & L. Martell, op.  cit. n. 24, at pp. 51-60; W. Hutton, The Stakeholding Society (1999 
); J. Kay, op.  cit. n. 42, Part III; B. Pettet, „The Stirring of Corporate Social Conscience‟ ( 1997 ) 50 
Current Legal Problems 279; P. Ireland, „Corporate Governance, Stakeholding and the Company : 
Towards a Less Degenerate Capitalism ?‟ ( 1996 ) 23 J.Law and Society  287 and D. Campbell, 
„Towards a Less Irrelevant Socialism : Stakeholding as a „Reform‟ of the Capitalist Economy‟ ( 1997 ) 
24 J. Law and Society 65.  
92
  See C. Leadbeater & G. Mulgan, „Mistakeholding: Whatever Happened to Labour‟s Big Idea ?‟ ( 
1996 ). 
93
 Op. cit. n. 91, at pp. 267-274. 
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94
 Id., at p. 274. For European influence in this regard in relation to the governance of companies see S. 
Wheeler, „Enterprise and Community : New Directions in Corporate Governance‟ ( 1997 ) 24  J. Law 
and Society 44 and J. Dine, „Implementation of European Initiatives in the UK : The Role of Fiduciary 
Duties‟ [ 1999 ] Company Financial and Insolvency Law Rev. ( forthcoming ). 
95
 See e.g. H.M. Treasury press releases „New Steps to Drive Forward Private Finance Initiatives and 
Public Private Partnerships‟ ( 2 February 1999 ) and „Launch of the I.P.P.R. Commission into 
Public/Private Partnerships‟ ( 20 September 1999 ). The partnership concept is all pervasive applying to 
the private sector alone, its relations to the public sector and its relations to the workforce see 
respectively Our Competitive Future, ch. 3 ( „Collaborate to Compete‟ ) and D.T.I. press releases, 
„New Focus for the Future of Partnering in Business and Government‟ ( 25 November 1998 ) and „New 
Civil Service Union a Model for Partnership‟ ( 26 November 1998 ). 
96
 See Tony Blair‟s speech on e-commerce ( 13 September 1999 ) where the modern state‟s role was 
expressly stated to be primarily facilitative and the greater use of self-regulation was encouraged. 
97
 See e.g. M. Freedland, „Government by Contract and Public Law‟ [ 1994 ] Public Law 86 and 
„Public Law and Private Finance: Placing the Private Finance Initiative in a Public Law Frame‟ in 
Regulation and Deregulation : Policy and Practice in the Utilities and Financial Services Industries, 
ed.  C. McCrudden ( 1998 ) ch. 8 and P. Craig, „Public Law and Control Over Private Power‟ in The 
Province of Administrative Law, ed. M. Taggart ( 1997 ) ch. 10. For a very stimulating discussion of 
the dynamics of this relationship see D. Oliver, „The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law‟ in 
id. ch. 11 and „Common Values in Public and Private Law and the Public/ Private Divide‟ [ 1997 ] 
Public Law 630  and  G. Teubner, „After Privatisation ? The Many Autonomies of Private Law‟ ( 1998  
) 51 Current Legal Problems 393. For  specific application to corporate law see D. Sugarman, op. cit. 
n. 63. 
98
  Such issues have particularly exercised theorists in the U.S., se e.g.  J.W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of 
the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States 1780-1970 ( 1970 ) and M. V. Nadel, „The 
Hidden Dimension of Public Policy : Private Governments and the Policy-Making Process‟ ( 1972 ) 1 
Policy Studies J. 2. See also, A. Fraser, Reinventing Aristocracy : The Constitutional Reformation of 
Corporate Governance ( 1998 ) who argues for a re-politicisation of the corporation through 
Republican political theory and S. Wheeler, „Towards A Feminisation of the Corporation ?‟ ( 1999 ) 52 
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Current Legal Problems ( forthcoming )  who sketches a theoretical model of the company based upon 
Aristotelian virtue ethics and an ethic of care as a way of grounding corporate legitimacy. 
99
 See generally,  J. Braithwaite, „Accountability and Governance Under the New Regulatory State‟ ( 
1999 ) 58 Australian J. of Public Administration 90 and more specifically in the U.K. context, R. A. W. 
Rhodes, Understanding Governance ( 1997 ) chs. 2 & 3 and P. Vincent Jones, „The Regulation of 
Contractualisation in Quasi-markets for Public Services‟ [1999] Public Law 304. 
100
 This would appear to be the inevitable flip side of seeking to promote enterprise and risk in public 
services ( as to the latter policy see the speeches of Tony Blair to : the Civil Service Conference in 
London ( 13 October 1998 ) and the N.C.V.O. Conference in London ( 21 January 1999 )) and led to 
the O.E.C.D. adopting the Recommendation Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service on 
23 April 1998. For an examination of the sort of difficulties that might arise in the corporate sphere see 
S. Wheeler, „Contracting Out in the UK Insolvency Service: the Tale of Performance Indicators and the 
Last Cowboy‟ ( 1997 ) 7 Australian J. of  Corporate Law 227. 
101
 See e.g. D.T.I. press release „Measures to Cut Red Tape and Reduce the Burdens on Business 
Announced‟ ( 3 June 1999 ). Better regulation is conceived in both qualitative and quantitative terms 
and the Government is committed to improve the former and the reduce latter especially as it is 
explicitly recognised that regulation puts a disproportionate burden on SMEs ( see e.g. the Better 
Regulation Task Force, Regulation and Small Firms ( Progress Report ) ( July 1999 ); Our Competitive 
Future, para. 2.28 and D.T.I. consultation document The Small Business Service ( June 1999 ) section 4 
). Considerable efforts have been made to this end : e.g. the Regulatory Impact Unit of the Cabinet 
Office ( advised by the independent Better Regulation Task Force ) has instituted a Better Regulation 
Guide including not only a statement of general principles but also a Regulatory Impact Assessment 
process. For a discussion some of the complexities and practical issues involved in regulation generally 
see J. Kay & J. Vickers, „Regulatory Reform : An Appraisal‟ in The Law of the Business Enterprise, ed.  
S. Wheeler ( 1994 ) 419 and C. McCrudden (ed.), op.  cit. n. 97 . 
102
 A term seemingly coined by Mr. E. Mayo, Director of the New Economics Foundation : The 
Guardian, 7 November 1998. On regulation by values rather than rules see J. Kay, Community Values 
and the Market Economy ( 1997 ) ch. 2. 
103
  See the New York Speech. 
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104
 For an extended analysis of how culture ( backed by sanctions ) can be invoked pursuant to a 
Republican model of dialogical democracy in order to check the private power of business see J. 
Braithwaite, „On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected Dimensions of a Republican 
Separation of Powers‟ ( 1997 ) 47 University of Toronto Law J. 305. 
105
 Extract from the speech to the U.K.-U.S. Conference on Entrepreneurship ( 2 July 1999 ). 
106
 P. Ireland, „Endarkening the Mind : Roger Scruton and the Power of Law‟ ( 1997 ) 6 Social & Legal 
Studies 51, at p.73. Similar sentiments are to be found in P. Minford, op. cit. n. 48, who refers to, 
“communitarian thought police” and S. Driver and L. Martell, op. cit. n. 24 , at pp. 35 - 44. For some 
general difficulties see A. Crawford, „The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the 
Communitarian Agenda‟  ( 1996 ) 23 J. Law and Society 247. 
107
 See J. Braithwaite, op. cit. n. 68; M. Castells, op. cit. n. 12, vol. 3, at pp. 379-380 and S. Wheeler 
and G. Wilson, „Corporate Law Firms and the Spirit of the Community‟ ( 1998 ) 49 Northern Ireland 
Legal Q. 239, at pp. 216-266.  
108
 Often it will be perfectly proper at law for a new company to take up the assets of a failed company 
even though both companies are controlled by the same individuals and this creates some resentment 
amongst other members of the business community, see National Audit Office, Company Director 
Disqualification - a Follow Up Report, HC ( 1998-9 ) 424, at paras. 3.35-36. 
109
 The recent move by the I.O.D. to obtain professional recognition for company directors by way of 
the new chartered director status and the focus on substantive business practice in the Turnbull Report : 
Internal Control Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code ( 1999 ) will doubtless provide subject 
matter and the author agrees with D. Sugarman, op. cit. n. 63, at p. 183 that the trajectory of the debate 
will be towards a model of company law as public regulation. 
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